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2.1979 WL 5000/10128 DMS 12-00 K.C.M. CO. 000 (12/79)

15A

PF 001,998

FILE CLOSED

W. E. L. E. OSKAR.


See Also

LINK A - Top locate - Material

10324

FILE CLOSED

Officer or Serial No	Section	Date



PF601998/V1

Officer or Serial No	Section	Date

Dys 12 Feb 1986

0621

Rms 25.4.96

of Who's Who Sheet.

REIL

2a

Names.

REIL Oberstlt.

REIL Major Oskar

? 14/w unidentified German staff Colonel (q.v.)

? 14/w RAIL (q.v.)

Source.HARLEQUIN 1942.
II/361 12.3.42.
DUTEL 1943
M.S.S. Pre March
1943.

BRUTUS 1941.

PELLETIER 1941.

Description

Nationality: German

DUTEL

Age: Approx. 50 (1943)
48 (1942)
Born 1896DUTEL
HARLEQUIN
S.I.S. IndexHeight: 1.90 m.
1.75 - 1.80 m.DUTEL
HARLEQUINBuild: Thin
SlimDUTEL
HARLEQUINHair: Going grey at temples
Slightly greying black hairDUTEL
HARLEQUINEyes: Blue, very deeply set
Startlingly piercing grey eyes.
Horn rimmed glasses.DUTEL
HARLEQUINFace: Clear complexion, fairly big nose.
Pointed chin, clean-shaven.
Narrow, sharply cut face.DUTEL
HARLEQUIN

Appearance: Very upright, stiff. Wore uniform.

DUTEL

Voice: Very distinct.

DUTEL

StatusSince March 1943, Leiter III Alst Paris. Previously Leiter
III ? which position he retained on becoming Leiter III.Occupation.

Officer of the German General Staff.

DUTEL

Miscellaneous.

Disappointed Party member.

HARLEQUIN

History.

May 1940.	Major REILE, with a mobile Abwehr Kommando in Northern France.	Old III Group
28.6.41.	Official III P Alst Paris. Received report from Toulon giving the address of an English agent in Paris.	III/9
March-Sep. 1941.	In communication with Marseilles concerning the movements of various agents.	III/18
20.11.41.	Working in active collaboration with RTV (Technical Radio Department) in locating illegal transmitters.	II/3
21.2.42.	Announced to Berlin the capture of three enemy transmitting sets.	II/3
12.3.42.	Had been promoted Oberstlt. Discussed with Oberts. DEUBACH, at that time Leiter III P Ast Angers, the suggestion of the Admiral i/o France, of putting misleading information about mine fields into the hands of the enemy.	II/361
November 1942.	Reported to have arrived from San Sebastian in Madrid, stayed at the Palace Hotel with POLMER & Jean RICHIER, a Belgian agent working in Brussels and Paris who had many connections with Gruppe III Alst Paris and was in touch with LIMA de FONSECA, an agent of X.C. Portugal Gruppe III.	S.I.S. 18.5.43
5.4.42.	In Paris. Took over an agent ROCELIO from Leiter III San Sebastian.	II/123
29.6.42.	Interested in a V-Jann who had been slipped through to San Sebastian via St. Jean de Luz.	II/374
20.11.42.	Met Hauptmann SCHMIDT, official III P Lyons, at Lyons. Possibly went on to Bourges.	II/301
30.11.42.	Arrived at Lyons with Oberst MEDOLFE, Leiter Alst Paris, Oberst GUTHE, then Leiter I.L. Paris and Major HUELLER, liaison officer at Wiesbaden between the Abwehr and the German Aviation Commission. Proceeded the following day with them to Marseilles for a conference with GUTHRIE then on a tour of inspection.	III/59 28.11.42.
19.1.43.	Offered by CRAMER, Leiter III Lisbon, the services of a Polish V-Jann PASTOR who had good connections in Paris.	II/300
1.2.43.	Date suggested by von ROEBENHUT Leiter Gruppe III Madrid, for a meeting between himself, REILE and a Brussels representative to discuss interesting material found on two enemy couriers plying between Belgium, France and Spain. The couriers had been arrested at Toulouse, by collaboration between the Sipo and SD and the Abwehr.	II/123 30.1.43.
11.4.43.	REILE escorted BERNAS, a member of the P.P.F. and head of an intelligence service working for the Germans, together with four members of his organisation, LATHON, DUTET-HARISPE, FALDON and DUTAIL from Paris to Munich. The five men were en route to Tunis to set up a Post-occupational service in Tunisia for conveying information by W/T to the Germans. At Munich REILE handed the party over to a Capt. of the German General Staff sent specially from Berlin to take them to Rome.	DUTAIL

History. (contd.)

17.5.43	In Paris asked Madrid if there was a reliable connection in Spain for planting misleading information on the English.	II/120
27.5.43	Expecting von ROUESCHMIDT and GENSOROWSKY, Leiter III San Sebastian, in Paris.	II/120
9.7.43	Interested in a V-Mann DEUKI to be despatched from Sofia to Paris.	II/3
6.8.43	Informed K.O. Switzerland of the arrest of an agent presumably connected with that country.	II/3
16.8.43	Referred to as Leiter III Alst Paris, GENSOROWSKY reported to REILE his arrival in Paris on 18.8.43 with a V-Mann for the purpose of contacting Giraud's courier on 19.8.43. Asked REILE to arrange party for supervision of meeting, or arrest.	II/380
23.8.43	Required a cover address in Lisbon for the receipt of letters from an agent in England. (Later message 20.10.43. H2, revealed this agent to be BEUTUS, a Pole sent by the Germans on a mission to U.K. in 1941, now working under British control)	II/380
26.8.43	REILE concerned with the operation of some "business" in Vienna previously discussed with GENSOROWSKY.	II/123
28.8.43	Had ascertained the address in Lisbon to which were delivered precision sets manufactured in Switzerland and intended for the English Air Force.	II/380
24.12.43	In Baden-Baden, probably for the conference of Abwehr officials which took place at that time. Received a report from Paris announcing the detection with the collaboration of the Sipo, of six enemy transmitters.	XII/7416
7.2.44	In Paris. Sent by CRAMER, Leiter III Lisbon the addresses in Paris used by the Free French Lisbon.	XIV/39
2.3.44	Receiving instructions from Berlin with regard to transmitters for the use of the Gruppe III network.	II/1
6.4.44	Had sent to Berlin a report from Spanish War Ministry concerning the discovery of a communist organisation allegedly built up by the American Embassy and intended to operate on the occasion of an Allied landing.	II/120

NEW CARD ☐

AMENDMENT TO SHARP No.

Name: **HEILE Cakar, Colonel**
© RITTER II.

Nat.	Col.	Germany:
Ger	A	N 246 XX Danzig N 247

Status: **Oberstleutnant. Leiter III Alst Paris.**
(Since Summer 43)

Address: **52 Fauborg St. Honore, PARIS**
4, Avenue Marceau, PARIS
10 rue des Pyramides, PARIS.

Description: **B.o 1896, Height 5'9" (1m75), thin sharp face, piercing eyes, wears glasses. Greyish hair. Blue eyes, clear complexion, fairly big nose, pointed chin. cleanshaven. Very upright and stiff. Speaks English and German, bad French.**

Misc: **Former police-man from Danzig.**

(Career) **Was reported to be in France (1940)**
Officer at the Abwehr "Nebenstelle" (Auxiliary service) in the Maison Lafitte, Paris (1940) Became Leiter III P PARIS. (Mar. 41). With BECKACK of Angers was responsible for a number of arrests in Brittany. (Feb. 42).
Concerned with the dispatch of an agent across the FRANCO-SPANISH frontier near ST. JEAN DE LUZ (Jun 42). Was in charge of a mobile intelligence unit which advanced as far as LYON during the total occupation of France (Nov. 42). Took part in a conference at MERSILLE presided over by CAHARD. (Nov. 42.)

64084

Source: **WR/Hef.**

File Copy
W.H. Form 1

Card No. 2
Name: REILE Oskar

NEW CARD ☐

AMENDMENT TO SHARP No.

Not. ☐ Cal. ☐ Germany: ☐

Status:

Address:

Description:

REMARKS:

Career: Was interested in the break-up of an Allied organisation in the South of France (Feb. 43)
Concerned with the dispatch of agents to N. Africa (Aug 43).
Is believed to have been appointed head of a Gruppe III Kommando recently formed
as a part of the Abwehr, emergency organisation in the West, but may have been
transferred to WIESENHOF.
Controls the organisation run by BEUGRAS and with DOBSCHEWITZ directs the
LAPONT organisation.
Commandant of the Leitstelle for Front Reconnaissance (für Frontaufklärung)
III West, located in Riedelbach b/Usingen (Taunus) (1945).

File Copy 64085.
W.H. Form 1 rev. 15.6.45

Number: WR/Ref.

<p>PP. 601,998 REISE Oaker</p> <p>Connection with G.I.B.</p> <p>To be read in conjunction with exhibits in the file</p>	<p>Sources:</p>
<p><u>1940.</u> According to an S.I.B. letter on the case of LEDEUR was in France in 1940. Confirmed by MIB.</p>	<p>PP. 600,201 LEDEUR PP.</p>
<p><u>March 1941.</u> Reconn Letter III F France.</p>	<p>PP. 600,201 LEDEUR</p>
<p><u>June 41.</u> Stated to be Leiter Abwehr III France since June 41. Rank Oberstlt.</p>	<p>B.1.Reg. Folder 33 3a.</p>
<p><u>Sept. 41.</u> Major RAILE, a naval commander, interviewed PELLETIER when he had agreed to work for the Germans. On this occasion all the officers were present in uniform. After a few minutes discussion PELLETIER was left alone with RAILE who spoke to him in English asking him if he had really decided to work for the Germans. PELLETIER replied that he had on condition that his father would be released unconditionally, to which proviso RAILE immediately consented.</p>	<p>PP. 6,227 PELLETIER</p>
<p><u>Feb. 1942.</u> Responsible for the arrest of a number of British agents in the North of France and at the end of 1942 in the whole of France.</p>	<p>SP. 52/France/5(27)</p>
<p><u>May 42.</u> According to HAUSSMANN III F inquiry for the largest section of the E.O. Paris and in May 1942 a new Gestapo General, was sent to Paris with instructions to take over all counter-espionage using the existing files and records to start with. RAILE explained bitterly and irrespective of any contradictions made by S.I.B., HAUSSMANN is convinced that this is true. The name of the Gestapo General may be Obergruppenführer THIEL. RAILE told THIEL in 1942 that after capturing a British W/T agent in France they continued to play him and made him order food, whisky, cigarettes, etc. to be sent from England by plane. The British promptly dropped the required articles and for weeks the whole Abwehr in Paris was "swimming in whisky".</p>	<p>PP. 66314 HAUSSMANN</p>
<p><u>June 42.</u> Concerned with the dispatch of an agent across the Franco-Spanish frontier near St. Jean de Luz. LEDEUR was advised to apply to Oberstlt. RAILE for the release of Roger SCHULZBERGER. RAILE approached Stuf. KIEFER IV Kri. a colleague of ROSENTHAL streaming the Abwehr's interest in the satisfaction of LEDEUR's quest. But several months passed before SCHULZBERGER was eventually released in October 1942. LEDEUR also applied to RAILE for the release of Dr. Hans von AINA and Austrian banker and a Jew. RAILE suggested that LEDEUR apply to Stuf. KIEFER. There was trouble later over this case as the SD disliked the Abwehr protecting a Jew who had served in the French Foreign Legion. The matter was left pending and AINA in the meantime was left unmolested. RAILE specialised in III F France during the occupation, then Leiter III. His A.D.C. was SIF. Count KERNITZ.</p>	<p>PP. 600,201 LEDEUR</p>
<p><u>July 42.</u> Further efforts were made during July 1942 to obtain an English W/T set for FRITZGER, to which end von GROENING shortly before he left for Jersey, had had discussions with Obstlt. RAILE, Leiter III in PARIS.</p>	<p>PP. 65101 CHAPLIN</p>

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<p align="center">*Connection with O.I.S.</p> <p align="center">To be read in conjunction with exhibits in the file</p>	<p align="center">Source</p>
<p><u>Aug. 42.</u> Very active in finding clandestine radio operators, also directing an Abwehr organisation of the P.P.F. in liaison with the Gestapo.</p>	<p>SP. 52/France/5(27)</p>
<p><u>Nov. 42.</u> According to an S.I.S. letter giving information on Jean RICHARD & FOLMER in connection with the case of Dorothy COOPER, a report of March 1943 from Madrid has revealed that in November 1942, Andre FOLMER shared a room at the Palace Hotel, MADRID with a certain REHE. They came from San Sebastian, and returned to Paris after staying in Madrid two days. REHE is clearly identical with Major REHE Head of Abt. III P Alst. PARIS.</p> <p>Was in charge of a Mobile Intelligence unit which advanced as far as Lyon during the total occupation of France.</p>	<p>PP. 63738 COOPER</p> <p>PP. 600,201 LEDEUR</p>
<p><u>Feb. 1943.</u> Became Leiter III PARIS in place of Prog. Capt. FRIEDER.</p> <p>RSS were doubtful that he became LEITER III at this time as FRIEDER was not promoted to Lt. I.M. until later in the year.</p> <p>Interested in the break-up of an Allied organisation in the South of France.</p> <p>Had worked with a certain SCHERER in Luxembourg who boasted of him as a close connection who gave him (SCHERER) protection. SCHERER claims not to have known REHE personally, but that his partner SCHERER had many dealings with him in the black market. Known as Leiter III Paris, who sent agents across the Franco-Spanish border and worked with GUYARD. Also sent agents to North Africa.</p>	<p>B.I. Folder 51</p> <p>PP. 600,201 LEDEUR</p> <p>PP. 601,383 SCHERER.</p>
<p><u>April 1943.</u> Reported by S.I.S. to be an Oberstlt. and to be head of III P Alst. PARIS.</p> <p>On April 11th 1943 accompanied BERGER, PATHAN, DUTEL, HARRIS, PILZON, MATHEW and DUTEL from Paris to Munich on their way to Berlin. He was then a Colonel having been promoted in January or February 1943. At MUNICH REHE handed them over to a Captain of the German General Staff who had come specially from Berlin and the party went on to Rome. Was said by BERGER to be head of the Intelligence of Counter-Spying Service in the West.</p>	<p>SP. 52/France/2 L.V.</p> <p>PP. 65934 DUTEL</p>
<p><u>16.8.43.</u> Referred to in MSS as Leiter III. His christian name may be Calmar.</p>	<p>PP.</p>
<p><u>AUG. 43.</u> Concerned with the dispatch of agents to North Africa. Is believed to have been appointed head of Gruppe III Kommand recently formed as part of the Abwehr emergency organisation in the West, but may have been transferred to TRENKARDT. Controls the organisation run by BERGER and with ROSENBERG directs the LAP IT organisation.</p> <p>Leiter Gruppe III Ant. Paris. Gruppenleiter III P Paris. Controlled French officer acting as W/T agent from N. Africa.</p>	<p>PP. 600,201 LEDEUR</p> <p>PP. 600,252 KLEIN</p>

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C. G. G. G.
C. G. G. G.

65a

T. A. K. K. K.
J. J. H. H. H.

Joan Paine.

60.

 $\leq r_{1,2}$

65a

NOV 2008

PP. 601,668 REILE Oskar.

*Connection with O.I.S. Page. 2.

Source:

To be read in conjunction with exhibits in the file

According to Lt. SPECK, Oberlt. REILE was Commandant of the Leitstelle for Front Reconnaissance (Frontaufklärung) III West located at Riedelbach b/Usingen (Taunus). Formerly Leiter of Abt. III P Paris.

PP. 601,388
SPECK

Seen occasionally by Henri LAPONT & CHAMBERLAIN, head of a Sipo organisation PARIS under the direction of HEDLER.

PP. 600,286
LAPONT/BOERTY

1944

Referred to by KRAUSE-BRANDSTETTER in his interrogation in Sept. 44. as Chief of Abwehr III, Hotel Lutetia, PARIS.

PP. 600,202 KRAUSE
-BRANDSTETTER.

RUPPOLT's recollection of the organisation of Gruppe III 1.S.W. was that Oberst. REILE was Leiter III Hotel Lutetia, PARIS.

PP. 600,401
RUPPOLT

Thought to be possibly identical with a 2nd Lt. REILE an Abwehr officer at Maison Lafitte, near Paris, known to von HOFVEL an Abw. officer in Luxembourg from 1939-1942. REILE is described as age about 50, height 5'8", slim, wears glasses, former policeman from Danzig.

PP. 601,393
VON HOFVEL

8.	
19.6.45. From 21st. AG re BLEICHER and REILE.	8a.
9.	
19.6.45. Note re questioning of REILE by CID IC.	9a.
10.	
20.6.45. Note re identification of LEONE & IVAN by REILE.	10a.
11.	
20.6.45. To Camp 020 asking for interrogation of BLEICHER re REILE.	11a.
12.	
21.6.45. Incoming cable re interrogation reports on REILE.	12a.
13.	
22.6.45. Cable to the field re interrogation report on REILE.	13a.
14.	
Undated Copy of amendment to SHAF card No. 64084/5 for Oskar REILE	14a.
26.6.45. Copy of Memo from Camp 020 re BLEICHER, referring to REILE.	14b.

MINUTE SHEET.

Reference: T.E. 601,333

15.

29.6.45. From CSDIC with preliminary notes on interrogation of REILE 15z.
 3.7.45. Request to CSDIC for copies of interrogation on REILE. 15a.

16.

3.7.45. To V/48/F re REILE and GROSSKOPF. 16a

17.

3.7.45. To V/48/B re REILE and VIOLET. 17a.

18.

6.7.45. Note to B.I.A. re REILE. 18a.

19.

6.7.45. To CSDIC returning preliminary notes on interrogation of REILE. 19

20.

6.7.45. To V/48/B re information given by REILE. 20a.

21.

10.7.45. From OSS X-2 forwarding cable from BLISS 7.7.45. re REILE. 21a.

22.

11.7.45. V.R.C. note for interrogator of REILE at CSDIC. 22a.

10000 20700 100
 200000 8 40 100000
 1000000
 (RECORDS)
 CODE 5-340

[OVER]

23.

13.7.45. To C.D.I.C. U.K. enclosing further note to answer question 8 of Questionnaire.

23a.

24.

13.7.45. Note to WRD attaching extract from preliminary draft note on interrogation of REILE.

24a.

25.

16.7.45. Outgoing cable re VIOLET and REILE.

25a.

26.

17.7.45. To T.R.D. from T.R.C.4.A. re questions to be put to REILE.

26a.

27.

17.7.45. To V/48/B re interrogation of REILE.

27a.

28.

17.7.45. To G.C. & C.S. enclosing preliminary report on interrogation of REILE.

28a.

29.

17.7.45. T.R.C.4.A. note re visit to C.B.D.I.C. U.K.

29a.

30.

19.7.45. Note from WRB attaching extracts from C.R. files re VOLTERA and VIALLA.

30a.

MINUTE SHEET.Reference 601,998.

31.

20.7.45. Maria X-2 to 12th A.G. re information on REILE case. 31a.

32.

23.7.45. To S.O.E. forwarding rough note on report re REILE. 32a
23.7.45 T

33.

24.7.45. To C.S.D.I.C. UK re REILE and FOLMER. 33a.

34.

24.7.45 To C.D.I.C. forwarding note on DALLINIER 34a.

35.

25.7.45 To WRD re interrogation of REILE about LORR. 35a.
29.7.45. From C.S.D.I.C. re answers to questions put to REILE. 35b

36.

30.7.45. From B.I.F. to Professor Briscoe re REILE. 36a.

37.

31.7.45. To C.S.D.I.C. re 35b and REILE. 37a.

38.

30.7.45. From W.R.C.A.A. to V.48. Note on REILE's interrogation about VIOLET. 38a.

39.

29.8.45. Note from C.S.D.I.C. (UK) via W.R.C.A.A. re REILE's change of camp. 39a.

40.

29.8.45. C.S.D.I.C. report on REILE. 40a.

(FORM 237A/110)

41.

19.9.45. To DD/WR. Mr. Blum enclosing Top Secret Supplement to the REILE Interrogation report.

41a.

42.

19.9.45. To W.R.C. enclosing Top Secret supplement to the REILE Interrogation report.

42a.

22.9.45. Minutes from W.R.C. & from D/WR re copies of attached Top Secret Supplement to CSDIC(UK) S.I.R. 1719 Report.

42b.

43.

Minute

8.10.45. From V.48.P.8. requesting additional copies of the CSDIC SIR report # 1719 and 1720.

43a.

44.

6.11.45. Note to V.48.P. re reports on REILE.

44a.

45.

27.3.46. From R.D.B.1. requesting that SCHUMPER and REILE be interrogated re VIALES.

45a.

46.

1.4.46. To the field re 45a.

46a.

47.

8.4.46 From I.A.O.B. stating that REILE was in Camp 10 UK on the 25th February, 1946

47a.

48.

C.3/D(C.A.D)

Reference letter from B.C.A.B. at 47a, we should be grateful if you could ascertain the present location of Oscar REILE.

E.1a/Marrec

16.4.46

J.F.

Joan Paine.

49a.

50.

50a.

51.

51a.

52.

529.

53.

53a.

53b.

540

Reference 51a please see 52a and 53a.

Kleinman
" Cr

55.

55a

ॐ

56

56a
56b
56c.

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C-8 57.

Mr. Byrde, Secretariat.

The answers to the letter at 53b are as follows :

1. REILE

This man is at present ^{held} ~~also~~ in a P/W Camp in this country. He was brought over by CSDIC last August on our behalf. We have no further interest in him, and if this is what ^{wishes, I} suggest that we arrange for REILE's transfer to the French. No doubt P/W Section will be glad to get rid of him. Will you please let me know whether the French wish us to arrange for this transfer.

2. RAUE

We have no trace of this name, but I presume it is a mis-spelling of RAUE @ Gottfried REI @ GAUTHIER who was an RSMA official, assistant to HOSSEN in the Abt VI H.C., Bde. Flandran. RAUE was associated with the Breton Autonomist Movement and was concerned with the cases of, among others, Mce. GRISAF, MA'UELLI and SALVINOS. He had no connection, however, with the case of CARRE and presumably the French have confused him with Pierre de VINCOURT @ GAUTHIER who was a prominent member of the Allied net-work for penetration for which CARRE was largely responsible. I do not propose to make enquiries about this man until we are certain of his identity. Could you please ascertain this from the French ?

B. la/warreo

24.5.46

Joan Hains.

58

O. 1/C & D

As spoken, please see 53b and minute 57. As it appears that this office no longer has an interest in REILE at any rate, could you communicate to D.P.W. the anxiety of the French authorities to lay their hands on him. As you have pointed out, it is the responsibility of D.P.W. to decide whether this is desirable and what steps should be taken. Presumably there is already an established channel for this type of transfer, since, in view of para. 2 of 57 I shall, in any case, have to write to the French, I will take the opportunity of asking them what French authority they want REILE transferred.

Secretariat

30.5.46

C. G. Byrde.

59

30.5.46

To French authorities in reply to 53b re REILE

59a

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60.

Secretariat. C93

We spoke (Byrde - Farnival Jones). Before taking action on minute 58, I am tempted to await the reply to 59a. I should rather see something in writing from the French before putting this rather unusual request to the War Office.

C.I/C.A.D.
1 Jun 46

See Farnival Jones

61

30.5.46 From French authorities further to 53b re RAHE

61a

62

1.6.46 From French authorities in reply to 59a

62a

63

B.I.A./Harrec Miss Paine

Reference minute 57, your guess was right. It is RAHE & GAUTHIER in whom the French authorities are interested (62a).

I should be grateful for your views on the French request though it appears from minute 60 that they are likely to be unlucky.

Secretariat
12.6.46

C.G. Byrde
C.G. Byrde.

64

Secretariat Mr. Byrde. C93

The War Room has not been notified of RAHE's arrest. Perhaps Major Farnival Jones will ascertain from P.W.I. whether he is in fact held in this country.

We should have no objection to RAHE's transfer to the French authorities.

Jf.
J. Paine.

B.I.A./Harrec.
20th June 1946

WT 2010/1072 20th June 1946
WT 2010/1072 20th June 1946

[P.T. Over]

P.F. 601,998

Register No.

Minute Sheet No.

70.

6.7.46. Loose Minute to P.W. Inf. Bureau asking if they have any trace of W. RUE 70a

71.

15.7.46. From S.I.B. re 69a. 71a.

72.

23.7.46. To Captain re the handing over of REILE to the French. 72a.

73.

25.7.46 From Capitaine re REILE 73a

74.

Secretariat (Mr. Jovide)

Reference previous minutes arising from letter at
53b. please see 73a letter now received from Capitaine

Joan Paine.

P.I.B. Warred
5.7.46

75.

12.8.46. Reminder to P.W. Inf. Bureau re 70a 75a.

76.

15.8.46 Reply from P.W. Inf. Bureau in reply to 70a and 75a 76a

18.8.46. From P.W.I.B re information about Walter RUE. 76b

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P.L.O./Warne (Miss Paine)

77.

Reference minute 67. We have at last heard from the F.W. Information Bureau that Walter RUIE (No.B.157937) has been located since 19th February last, in Camp 124 which is situated at Bedminster Camp, Ashton Gate, Bristol 3.

W. RUIE

C.L./C.A.D.
19 Aug 46.

78.

2.8.46. From Int. Div. BACR in reply to 69a
15.8.46 From S.I.S re RUIE

78a
78b

79.

20.8.46. To INT Div. BACR concerning interrogation of RUIE, enclosing copies of his replies.

79a
79b

22.8.46. From Captain [redacted] re RUIE

79c

21.8.46. From BACR re. Order RUIE

80.

C.L./C.A.D.

Please see 79b a request from SIS for a further interrogation of RUIE. As the French are well aware, RUIE was first interrogated last September (you may feel that there is little justification for putting Northern Command to any further trouble on behalf of the French; particularly in view of their application for the loan of RUIE's body which was cancelled only after most of the arrangements had been made).

We are prepared to inform S.I.S that a further interrogation cannot be arranged.

John Paine
John Paine.

P.L.O./Warne
24.8.46

81.

27.8.46. To Captain [redacted] in reply to 79b
28.8.46. Letter to Northern Command re 52a and interrogation of RUIE on the lines suggested in 79b.

81x
81a.

82.

D.S. Major Hall.

Please see letter from B.I.O.R. at 79c, enclosing a request from the Belgian C.I. Mission to Germany for the loan of RUIE.

I should be grateful if you would obtain D.F.T.'s consent to this request, which is considered a reasonable one. If D.F.T. is willing, we will then suggest to B.I.O.R. that the Belgians make the necessary arrangements in direct liaison with the D.F. Section.

P.L.O./JP
31.8.46.

John Paine
John Paine.

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82.

2.9.46 Minute to P.W.1 requesting transfer of REILE to Brussels 82a.
 9.9.46 From B.A.O.R. requesting transfer of REILE to Belgian Auditeur General 82b

83.

P.L.A. (Miss Yaine)

Reference minute 82. I received a telephone message today from P.W.1, who said that they had no objection to the temporary transfer of REILE. If you will therefore invite B.A.O.R. to make the necessary arrangements with P.W.1, I think there will be no difficulty.

G.2/D.(C.A.D.)
 18 Sep 46

84.

18.9.46 From Northern Command re interrogation of REILE 84a.
 23.9.46 To B.A.O.R. re. transfer of REILE to Belgian Auditeur General 84b

85.

24.9.46 To S.I.B. re. interrogation of REILE and SCHAMPER 85a

86.

P.L.A. (Miss Yaine)

Reference your minute 80. Please see the letter from Northern Command at 84a.

G.2/D.(C.A.D.)
 25 Sep 46

87.

28.9.46. To S.I.B. re re REILE. 87a.

88.

20.11.46. Copy of letter from B.A.O.R. to Belgian C.I. Mission re R EILE. 88a.

89

F7.6.47. From B.A.O.R. re REILE.

89a.

90

C.S.

We would be grateful if you could supply the answer to
90a through Prisoner of War authorities.

M. Gunn
M. Gunn

B.2.5/10
17.6.47

91.

21.6.47. To P.W.I asking for information about REILE's whereabouts

91a.

92.

26.6.47. From P.W.I. Bureau replying to 91a and enclosing particulars of REILE

92a.

91.91

B.2.5/10

Ref. minute 90. The War Office's reply to my 91a is
enclosed at 92a. I think we may take it that P.W.I have tacitly
agreed to REILE fitting in with the arrangements required by the French
Authorities. I suggest that BAOR might be invited to make their own direct
arrangements with P.W.I. You may like me to tell P.W.I to expect a letter
from BAOR.

C.S.
27.6.47.

94

1.3. - Major Hill

Reference the above. I would be glad if you would write to
P.W.I as you suggest above, and return the file to me to reply
to the Intelligence Division's letter at 90a

M. Gunn
M. Gunn

B.2.5/10
17.6.47

Register No. P.P. 602,983.

Minute Sheet No. 7.

95.

7.7.47. To P.W.1 further to 91a and 92a - BAOR to communicate with P.W.1 -

95a.

mb.
D.2.b/Miss Gurney.

96.

Please see my minute to P.W.1 at 95a.

C.3.
7.7.47.

1. h. Hill

97.

4.7.47 To B.A. 17. re REHLE and proposed loan to French for interrogation purposes

97a.

20.8.47.

re Lt. Col. Oscar REHLE being interrogated about

98

98a.

99.

D.2.b. Mr. Belth.

REHLE is still at No. 18 Camp, HALTWHISTLE. You said you would let me have an Interrogation Brief.

C.3.
27.8.47.

Returned 29.8.47

100.

3.9.47.

Letter to Northern Command asking them to interrogate Oscar REHLE and find out how much he knows about the activities of a Belgian called MURIEL.

100a

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101.

B.2.b. (Miss Gurn)

Please see my letter to Northern Command at 100a. In the meantime I think it would be as well if you were to ask

This may take some time but on the other hand it will save time in the end if RHILE's information, given as a result of my letter, proves to be woolley.

S.H.H.M.

C.3.
3 Sep 47.

102

5.9.47. From S.I.S. re interrogation of RHILE re MARKEL

102a

103

8.9.47. To S.I.S. in reply to 102a re RHILE's interrogation.

103a

104

Note.

Reference Minute 101. I spoke to [redacted] of S.I.S. We will call up their files and see whether he can supply any further detail which will assist in the interrogation.

B.2.b.
4.9.47.

M. Gurn
H. Gurn.

105.

16.9.47. From Northern Command in reply to 100a. re RHILE.

105a

106.

23.9.47. From H. Cal. replying to 100a - further interrogation of RHILE

106a.

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Register No. PP. 601,998.

Minute Sheet No.

B.2.b. Miss Gunn.

107.

Please see the letter at 106a from Northern Command about the interrogation of REILE. The result is not at all illuminating. You will doubtless let me know whether you want me to do anything further in this case.

C.2.
24 Sep 47.

S.H.H.

108.

109.

C.2. - Major Hill.

of S.I.S. to-day enquired regarding the present whereabouts of Oscar REILE. I explained that the situation was still the same as described in my letters of 8th September and 1st October when arrangements were due to be made for REILE'S transfer to Germany for interrogation by the French.

said that he would very much like to know whether or not this transfer had taken place, or whether REILE was still in the U.K.

Could you please discover from Northern Command what the position is?

B.2.B.
27.10.47.

Minette Gunn
M. Gunn.

110.

29.10.47.
4.11.47

Letter to Northern Command asking if REILE is still at No.10 Camp.
Letter from Northern Command re interview of REILE

110a
110b.

111.

7.11.47 From H.Q. Northern Command re whereabouts of P/S Oscar REILE.

111a

112.

B.1.J. (Miss Gunn)

Reference Minute 109. Please see my letter at 110a and Northern Command's answer at 111a.

S.2.H.
7.11.47

S.H.H.

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114.

B.I.D

I spoke to P.W.1 who are expecting the arrival of two French police officials to interrogate REILLÉ. The French have been invited to say whether the officials concerned would like to see Reille in his camp at Daltaville or whether they would prefer Reille to be brought down to the London District cage.

P.W.1 have promised to let me know where and when the interrogation is to take place - as soon as they hear from France

E. H. Hill

C.2.

10.11.47

115

11.11.47 To S.I.S. re French interrogation of Oskar REILLÉ

115a

116

Note for File

On 1st December, Mr. Oldfield of S.I.S. informed me that a M. Berger of the Surveillance de Territoire was coming to London the next day in order to interrogate Oskar REILLÉ. Mr. Oldfield asked to be informed of the time and location of the interrogation so that S.I.S. could send a representative.

The interrogation was originally arranged for 10. o'clock on 5th December at London District Cage. I was informed later that an alteration had been made, and the interrogation had been postponed until 11 o'clock on Saturday, 6th December. The necessary arrangements have been made for to be present at the interrogation.

M. Gunn

L. Gunn

B.I.D/MC
6.12.47

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*footnote 12749/1205 (Tand) of 6 July 1978
 CC/200/20/61.

~~SECRET~~

C.S.D.I.C. (U.K.)
 S.I.R. 1720
 26 Aug 45

THIS REPORT IS SECRET

Report on further information obtained from FU CS/2245 Obaltt ~~REHE~~
 Comd. Leitstelle III West für Frontaufklärung, (CY 12749/1205)
 surrendered ~~REHE~~, 31 May 45

GERMAN DECEPTION PLANS AND THE
 ACTIVITIES OF ADWHR IIID

This report should be read in conjunction with SIR 1719.

REHE

1. For Prologue see SIR 1719.

ADWHR THE WAR

GENERAL
 FINDINGS

2. III D of 1st Luftw. which was set up in 1935, was never of major importance. It was at its height before the war and during the early part of the war, since when its importance steadily declined.
3. Deception was mainly carried out with the object of obtaining information about the organisation and methods of foreign intelligence services, and of finding out what foreign agents were in GERMANY or travelled to and from GERMANY. Only very rarely was information passed to foreign intelligence services with the object of giving a false picture of German military developments and plans.
4. The carrying out of deception before the war was entrusted to those agents who were considered very reliable and who were in contact with a foreign intelligence service. In order to obtain the information required by the GIB the agents had to have the confidence of the foreign intelligence service in question; in consequence the information passed to the foreign intelligence services was usually over completely false, and not infrequently accurate information was deliberately reported; such information, although accurate, was not, however, of great importance. On very rare occasions false documents were, before the war, deliberately passed to the Allies with the purpose of giving a false impression of German military organisation and plans.

WINTER

5. In 35 or 36, when P/ was with Lt KISSEL, documents containing false information about structure and strength of units in area KISSEL were passed to the French IS in 1942 by a former German IGO. The documents purported to be part of mobilization plans.

6. As far as P/ knows, agents used for passing deceptive information to the French were generally not used for passing deceptive information to the British also. It may have occurred that the same agent or group of agents was used for passing deceptive information to both countries, but P/ cannot quote an instance.

CONTROL OF
III D

7. Before the war, permission from III D was required in every instance in which it was intended to pass deceptive information to foreign intelligence services. III D required to have an exact copy of the false information to be passed out and photostatic copies of every document which was intended for foreign consumption. No deceptive information of any kind was to be sent out before it had been vetted by III D. This order was enforced with the utmost vigour, and failure to comply with it resulted in proceedings before court martial or a trial for treason.

8. It was intended that III D should be notified of all counter-espionage contacts, in order to be able to study the possibilities of large-scale military deception and also in order to avoid duplication in the passing of deceptive information to the Allies. III D was also required to register all information passed for deceptive purposes to the Allies, with the primary purpose always to be able to check whether the agents had passed the information in the exact form agreed to.

ALLIED STAFFS
AND ETC.

9. Until the outbreak of war, III D was in close contact and worked satisfactorily with the GCH, the F. Intelligence, the Luftwaffe and the GCH. III D informed these staffs of its operations and asked for comment, in order to ensure that no information should be passed to the Allies which might harm any part of the Wehrmacht. Naturally these staffs were shown by III D what possibilities existed for the passing of false information to the Allies in the immediate future.

4. DURING THE WARGENERAL
PRINCIPLES

10. Military deception was carried out throughout the war in all the theatres of war. There was no central direction of deception operations, but ideas for single deception plans were studied from time to time in circumstances required by the various units in their respective areas.

11. After the outbreak of war the main object of German deception operations was to deceive the Allies about German military events, the strength of troops in various areas, and operational plans.

- 3 -

SECRETDETAILS OF
MORSE

12. As for their authorization, whilst III D declined in importance, military counter-espionage centres nonetheless applied for permission to carry out deception operations to the appropriate C in C, e.g. on the Western front to C West. This innovation was made because the former method of applying for permission to III D had proved to be too slow and complicated and because III D had frequently been unable to give quick decisions as a result of rapid changes in the military situation.

DETAILS OF
MORSE

13. It became the sole responsibility of the various Cs in C to decide whether suggested material could be used for deception. If they decided in the affirmative, the carrying out of the deception plans was, as heretofore, in the hands of the military counter-espionage centres.

14. These centres were strictly forbidden to carry out any political deception.

15. When a deception scheme had been carried out the centres had to send a report to III D as soon as possible, in which they gave a detailed account of the information passed to the Allies, together with photostatic copies of any deception documents. On receipt of this report, III D informed, as before, OKI, S. Kriegsmarine, Luftwaffe, Wehrmacht, Generalstab and the various military commands.

16. It sometimes occurred that these staffs took the initiative in carrying out large-scale deception operations. In this case they passed their instructions to III D, which then passed appropriate orders to the counter-espionage centres in question, e.g. in the case of Luftwaffe III West. This centre then carried out C West and carried out the operation in accordance with the latter's orders.

17. Gradually, some of Army Groups and Armies became interested in deception. If they wished to carry out deception in their own areas, they required the permission of their CC. When they had obtained this, they gave orders for the carrying out of their deception plan to the local unit of Frontaufklärung III. This unit informed the appropriate Luftwaffe III or the appropriate Wehrmacht III, which in turn notified III D.

DETAILS OF
III D

18. During the last year of the war III D lost the remnants of its power. In the course of the various reorganizations to which the German High Command, III D was placed under command of OKI. The officers who had no previous experience were transferred to the reorganized III D. According to FU, they were so inexperienced that III D was completely ineffective during the last six months of the war, with the result that C in C in the various theatres of war became independent and final judges of matters concerning deception plans in their areas, while the Luftwaffe III and the Frontaufklärung III had the last word in carrying out deception operations.

DETAILS OF
DECEPTION

19. While, during the pre-war period, deception operations were carried out only through agents, the war opened up other possibilities. The best method from the German point of view was the operating of HF transmitters which had been in the possession of III D agents. This method was considered ideal for passing intelligence reports to the Allies quickly and securely.

1/4

LETTERS OF
DECEPTION
(cont.)

20. At the same time, the Germans continued to pass false information to the Allies through agents who, if necessary, were sent through the Allied lines.
21. A third method used was to give deceptive information to persons who, for political or military reasons, wished to reach the Allies. Without these persons being aware of it, it was not possible or easy for them to cross the lines. When such persons reached the Allies, they imparted the deceptive information in the belief that it was derived from anti-Nazi who were carrying on espionage in GERMANY and who were looking for a way to pass their information to the Allies. This method was only used in important instances and only when there was no other opportunity available on any particular sector of the front. Usually at least two agents were planted among a group of foreign or German civilians who were working in the operational area. The agents then contacted such foreigners or German communists or other German anti-Nazi who intended to desert to the Allies as soon as they had the chance. The agents then enabled the workers to cross the lines and entrusted them with the deceptive information.
22. As mentioned above, the main object of deception was to deceive the Allies in respect of German military plans and the strength of the German troops in the field. In order to succeed in this object, the German staffs frequently carried out elaborate preparations. For example, units of a div were given different tactical signs and div emblems with the object of causing the Allies to believe that more than one div was involved. On other occasions, transport was made to move in order to simulate troop movements.
23. In Nov/Dec 44, Headquarters 3 ordered FMK 307 to pass information to the Allies which would lead them to believe that considerable reinforcement of troops was taking place in the area WEST of the RHINE. This was done with the object of diverting the attention of the Allies from the RHINE area itself, where preparations for the German winter offensive were taking place. In this operation use was made of persons whose passage through the lines was facilitated without their knowing it by German agents on the ground, in the opinion of the Germans, to be regarded as reliable by the Allies. It cannot state whether and to what extent the Germans succeeded in deceiving us, but he does know that the Allied intelligence services followed up the German deception in that they twice confirmed receipt of the deceptive information by agreed code sentences transmitted by the FIC as requested by the Germans.
24. Similar activities were carried out by FMK 306 for Headquarters 4. It cannot remember an actual instance. FMK 311 did not carry out deception.
25. Unit VI 2 may have carried out political deception.
26. When the Southern part of the Western Front was on the RHINE, Headquarters 6 ordered FMK 314 to pass false information about fictitious troop concentrations in a wooded area EAST of the RHINE near the Swiss border. It does not know what methods were used to pass the deceptive information to the Allies. The area in question was on several occasions heavily shelled by Allied artillery, and it was assumed that this was the result of FMK 314's successful operation. In actual fact there were no German troops in the area.
27. As far as it is known, there were no plans for future deception operations.

- 5 -

SECRETC. PERSONNEL28. Obst SCHNEIDER

Left Gruppe III D from approx 35 until approx winter 41/42. Left Alsbach in order to become a General. Was promoted General about 42/43, when he was Full Colonel in area LILLE. He does not know what became of him thereafter.

Description: Age about 63, height about 1.77 m, slim, long narrow face, long grey hair with parting, wears glasses.

29. Int. ZIMM or ZIMMER

Assistant to Obst SCHNEIDER. Was a high-ranking Militärberater.

Description: Age about 35, height about 1.77 m, slim build, long fair hair with parting.

30. Obstlt G. THUMME

Left Gruppe III D after Obst SCHNEIDER, from about winter 41/42 to early 44. Left III D in 44 and became Alsbach Officer with Stellvertreter Generalmajor RUMIG and was promoted Obst.

Before THUMME became Leiter of Gruppe III D he had worked in Gruppe III F with Obst ROSENBERG.

Description: Age about 48, height about 1.70 m, slim build, long grey hair with parting. Regular officer.

31. Obstlt Herbert SCHNEIDER

From Apr 43 to Feb 44 SCHNEIDER was PW's Deputy when PW was Leiter III in WEST PRUSS. SCHNEIDER simultaneously ran III 44. When PW became Kommandeur of Leitstelle III WEST in Feb 44 SCHNEIDER became Leiter of III in PRUSS which position he retained until Aug 44. Then he became Leiter Gruppe III D from Sep or Oct 44. PW cannot state whether he retained his position when III D was placed under comd of III 44 RUMIG, but believes that SCHNEIDER would have attempted to get away as he was anti-Nazi.

Description: Age about 52, height about 1.75 m, sandy hair, wears glasses. Lived in WITTMAR. Regular officer.

C.S.D.I.C. (U.S.)
26 Aug 45

Description:
I.I.15(a) War Office (100 copies)
I.I.16 Admiralty (4 copies)
I.I.17(x) Air Ministry (6 copies)

6

C.S.D.I.O.(U.K.)
S.I. 1719.
29 Aug 45.

THIS REPORT IS SECRET

Report on information obtained from 77 GS/2245 GOSIA RUMA
Gend Leitstelle III West "Ir. Front-
aufklärung", surrendered TMBB, 31 May 45

NOTES ON LEITSTELLE III
WEST-203
FRONT-AUFKLÄRUNG

ALPHA

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SECRETREMARKS

1. PW is a 40-year-old regular officer who became a member of Gruppe III, Berlin in 1936 (for details of career see Appendix 1). In Feb 44 PW was appointed head of Leitstelle III WEST für Frankreich, a position he held until the end of the war with GERMANY. In this capacity he was i/c about 50 officers and about 500 NCOs and GIs. PW was himself chiefly concerned with the supervision of the officers working under him and of their units, and with the evaluation of information obtained by the agents run by the PAs and PAs of the Leitstelle.
2. PW is a strange personality. He is at the same time naive and shrewd. He writes poetry, is a nature-lover and driver, and yet he appears to have run his counter-espionage organisation with a fair measure of success. He is intelligent and has a good memory for recent matters, but is less accurate where earlier events are concerned.
3. PW at first refused to give any information which would tend to incriminate his unit's staff or agents. It was possible to persuade him to change his mind, and PW then talked freely on all topics. The information is considered reliable.

I. ORGANISATION OF
LEITSTELLE WEST

A. STAFFHEADQUARTERS

- | | |
|---|---------------------------|
| I. Kommandeur: | Obstlt REULE (PW) |
| II. Deputy Kommandeur and holder of the Agents' Training Schools and Agents: | Obstlt RUDOLFF |
| assisted by: | Hptm WIEGAND |
| III. Evaluation of information received from PAs, PAs and KRM IV concerning Allied operations: | Major JÜTNER |
| assisted by: | Stabs Dr. ZEPPE |
| IV. Evaluation of information received from PAs, PAs and GIs concerning the organisation and methods of Allied Intelligence Services in the WEST: | Hptm MÖLLER. |
| V. Section dealing with Personnel and Equipment (including IT): | Hptm LUTHER |
| VI. Pay and Accounts: | Stabsintendant DÖTTINGER. |
| VII. (Recent appointment) Liaison Officer with Aufklärungsmittel (AM): | Colt DEBEL |
| VIII. (Recent appointment) Liaison Officer with PAs, AM VI 2 (Obstlt WIEGAND): | Colt HIEBER |

SUBORDINATE
STAFF

5. Approx 45 HCOs and ORs.

12 Stabsshelferinnen.

The 45 HCOs and ORs were: Drivers (about 20), WT operators (about 15), interpreters, draughtsmen, clerks etc.

During the last few months of the war these figures were somewhat reduced.

D. CHAIN OF COMMAND

6. The Kommandeur of Leitstelle III WEST was under command of West for disciplinary and operational purposes; he was under command of Lt IV in respect of intelligence matters. The personnel of the Leitstelle were under command of the Kommandeur in all respects.

C. PERSONALITIES

OFFICERS

7. Hr. JÜTTER

About 50 years old. Joined counter-espionage in 1943. Reserve officer. A lawyer in civilian life. Since summer 44 worked on evaluation, from the military point of view, of information received. He carried out his duties very satisfactorily. I believe that he had nothing to do with the running of agents.

8. Hr. JÄGER

Reserve officer. About 46 years old. A business man in civilian life. Has employed since summer 44 in evaluating information about the organization and methods of Allied Intelligence Services. He was rather slow but very conscientious and thorough. Was not concerned with the running of agents.

9. Hr. JÄGER

Reserve officer. About 50 years old. Worked in the field of counter-espionage since about 1930. Originally with 1st 'TIERSTEIN'. Is believed to have tried to become a regular officer, but did not succeed. Was a police officer before 1933 and belonged to, or was in close contact with the Zentrum Party, which may account for his failure to become a regular officer. Was transferred from 1st 'TIERSTEIN' to 1st Leitstelle RHEIN after the French campaign. He was good at his work, which consisted chiefly of evaluation; he also ran a few agents. When Leitstelle III WEST was established he became officer in charge of personnel matters and equipment, since when he did not run agents nor did he perform any evaluation work.

10. Oberrat RUDOLFF

Joined Abwehr II shortly before the war. Was in BERLIN and then in GERMANY or PORTUGAL for a time. Was subsequently attached to Afrika Korps. Late in 1943 became member of III P 1st RHEIN. In the 44 became Deputy Chief of III P 307 and held this position until May 44. RUDOLFF was a regular officer. He lived in BERLIN and was married, but was getting a divorce. No children. He was a typical German officer and fond of good living. He was not particularly good at his work. Was last seen by I in S. BEVERLY near R.D. TOLSON on or about 20 Apr 45. Age about 45, height medium, very slim build, hair grey, long and combed back, eyes light. Long, narrow, clean-shaven face, long nose, pale complexion.

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SECRETFROM11. PAUL ROBERT V. HENRI

About 29 years old. On staff of Leitstelle III West. Assisted PW as interpreter and in PW's other duties. Has considerable "savoir faire" and speaks several languages perfectly, especially French and Russian. His wife is a Russian aristocrat.

12. PAUL SCHUBERT

About 40 years old. On staff of Leitstelle III West. Recently in charge of training agents in the school at RLD 25. Has agents in FRANCE from 1942 to 1944. Speaks perfect English and very good French. Is the son of a SAATCHI business man who worked in CHINA for a few years before the war. Is handicapped by a severe wound in one arm.

13. OTTO V. REIDEMANN

About 35 to 38 years old. Worked on the staff of Leitstelle III West from spring 44 until the end 44, in the section dealing with military evaluation under Maj JUTNER, where he was considered very capable. During the last few months of the war he assisted Obstdt REIDEMANN in the running of agents' training schools. He is very able and shrewd and speaks several languages well.

DISCHARGE
OF III
OFFICERS
PARSED BY
LEITSTELLE
FROM 1944

14. PW says that so far as he knows there is nothing behind these discharges and that he knows of no plan to continue work against the Allies.

15. BERNHARD

PW confirms that he was discharged for "moral turpitude" and that this was the only ground for his dismissal. BERNHARD had an affair with a certain Frau ALTH. This was frowned upon by the authorities. BERNHARD was at one time also suspected of having used the German Army funds to buy jewels for his mistress. Nothing of the kind was ever proved and PW believes him innocent.

16. REINHOLD

Was transferred to the Department of Chief Frontward Officer, Berlin III West (Chief REINHOLD).

17. RODOLPH

Was discharged because he was extremely nervous and unbalanced with everybody. It was intended that he should join RLD 25, but PW does not know whether this took effect.

18. ALTH

Was relieved of his post and discharged on account of heart trouble.

19. ALTH

Has never been of any use to III. PW believes that he had been loyal to REINHOLD before his release, which was made on his own request and treated with pleasure.

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DISCLOSURE
OF
COMMUNIST
INFLUENCE
IN
THE
ARMY OF THE
UNITED STATES
(CONF.)

20. INTERVIEW

PI confirms that he had TB.

21. PI pointed out that all these men, with the exception of TIEGHEIMER, were over 30 and unable to stand up to conditions of mobile warfare as experienced during attachment to Diva etc. They were able to stand the strain while serving under static conditions.

D. SUBORDINATE UNITS

NAME AND
RANK OF
SUBORDINATE
FROM

22. PIK 306:

Major v FELDGEN

Under operational command of Heeresgruppe B, containing Pztrs 303, 304, 306, 308, 365 and two others which PI has forgotten.

23. PIK 307:

Obstlt GIESZES

Under operational command of Heeresgruppe B, containing Pztrs 362, 363, 364, 396 H(arino).

24. PIK 313:

Obstlt DECHMANN

Under operational command Heeresgruppe C, containing Pztrs 352, 357, 359, 361.

PIK 359: PI confirmed that the original one was at MARSEILLE and AIX in summer 44 and was captured almost on place. The PIK 359 which turned up in TULLE under PIK 306 in spring 45 was a new unit. It consisted of about 9 members of Pztr 357, which had been overrun during the German retreat and of which the members had become separated, plus some new personnel sent by Chief Pontaudouling from Grenadier Ersatz Bn 2 (7).

25. PIK 314:

Obstlt FIECK

Under operational command AOK 19, containing Pztrs 353, 355, 360.

DISCLOSURE
OF
COMMUNIST
INFLUENCE
IN
THE
ARMY OF THE
UNITED STATES
(CONF.)

26. This centre consisted of Kapit'n zur See FROYE, who was generally known as "Oscar Richard", and his assistant Präfektin SCHROEDER, generally known as "Tante Lena".

27. FROYE was an old friend of Admiral GUNDEL, whom he met during the 1934-35 war. In the 1930's FROYE was employed by German Intelligence, and when GUNDEL became Chief of Abwehr, FROYE became his right hand man in the field of counter-espionage and was the first Chief of Gruppe IIIV; this post he held until 1938/39. FROYE, who was by no means a young man, was not equal to the work that this position entailed and was therefore succeeded in 1939 by Oberst ROEDER.

28. PI heard that FROYE, in appreciation of his past services and because of his regularity, was given the opportunity after 1939 of establishing a centre in accordance with his wishes; he was to run this centre with such energy as remained to him. This centre was connected with IIIV TULLE. It was not controlled by IIIV, but directly by Abwehr II, to which FROYE sent his reports. During the occupation of TULLE the centre remained independent, under ROEDER's immediate control.

SECRET

SECRET-
 (SIC) (SIC)

29. This state of affairs continued until autumn 44, when FROZE's centre was placed under command of Leitzstalle III West, and SCHUBER was posted to JST IV of same. It was considered desirable that Disnostelle "P" should in future cooperate more closely with FROZE's centre. FROZE's centre was closely with the recipient of FROZE's reports and results, but the channel used both for dispatches and for traffic was the RLY located in HOLLAND, which during the last phase of the war was RLY 306. This resulted in the efficient cooperation between FROZE and JST IV von FROZE.

30. FROZE would have preferred to work in close cooperation with RLY but the distance between their respective locations and the pressure of work of a more important kind on which RLY was engaged, made this impossible. RLY never found time to visit FROZE and states that he does not even know how Disnostelle "P" was organized, nor exactly where in HOLLAND it was located.

31. Disnostelle "P" was given the same tasks as FLYS and FLYS, i.e.

- (a) The obtaining of information through counter-espionage about Allied military plans
- (b) The establishing of contacts for the purpose of passing deceptive information
- (c) Penetration, through agents, of Allied intelligence organizations and groups of agents.

32. The results obtained by FROZE were, in view of his age and lack of staff, considerably good. They were naturally much smaller than those achieved by FLYS. As far as RLY knows FROZE succeeded only on one or two occasions in penetrating groups of Allied agents in FLYS. He had several agents who, when the front was in SWITZERLAND, penetrated the Allied lines for the purpose of obtaining military information for JST IV, or for passing deceptive information to the Allies. RLY is unable to give details of these operations.

33. One of FROZE's agents was a man of Polish descent who had a Polish name which RLY cannot remember. He lived in FLYS during the German occupation and was an antique or picture shop with his wife. His cover name was JST IV. He is about 44 yrs old, medium height, dark. RLY cannot say whether or not he stayed behind in FLYS when the Germans retreated. He never heard of him again.

SECRET-
 (SIC) (SIC)

OFFICIALS' COPIES ONLY

34. The most constant officers of Leitzstalle III West were those in command of FLYS, who were far older than the others.

35. Obstlt GEBEL, RLY 307

Age about 47 years. Regular officer. With JST IV since 1938 or 1939. Alert, shrewd, full of initiative. Served in HOLLAND and SCHUBER. Successfully carried out deception operations ordered by Military Command there. The transmission in HOLLAND, used agents from HOLLAND, were nearly always under his control. He was an expert in penetrating enemy contacts and resistance organizations.

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PERSONALITIES
(contd)

36. Obstlt. WILHELM PAUL JIL

Regular officer, aged 48 - 49 years. Had formerly worked in counter-espionage in the EAST. Joined Abwehr in 1941 or 1942, where he was SCHUBERT's first assistant. Transferred to Leitstelle III West in spring 44. Was PA's deputy (until Sep 44). Then took command of PAJ JIL when SCHUBERT was transferred to NSMA VI 2. In this position WILHELM worked excellently. He was particularly good at cooperating with armies, corps and divisions and in carrying out Frontaufklärung in the main line of defence. He was also excellent at evaluating information and had considerable knowledge of Allied Intelligence Services, including the Russian.

37. Major v. FRIEDRICH PAUL JOE

Had formerly been a regular officer. Was available for employment again since 1942. Had been in Abwehr since about 1935. Worked for Amt ZOBEN before the war in HOLLAND with the task of obtaining information about the British Intelligence Service. During the first few years of the war he was employed in many different ways. In Apr 43 he joined III P in Abwehr Leitstelle, PARIS. He became commander of PAJ JOE in PARIS in Mar 44. He was a good soldier, energetic and experienced in counter-espionage. A good organizer and leader of men. His PAJ was therefore successful. He personally, according to PJ, rarely ran agents or spoke to them. He had good and quick judgment and his evaluation of information was sound. Von FRIEDRICH was a distant relation of Admiral GROSCH. This fact may explain why v. FRIEDRICH was often in conflict with the local Sipo, who tended to interfere with his work. Von FRIEDRICH, on the orders of Admiral GROSCH, insisted on the correct treatment of all prisoners of war and agents, and imposed severe punishment in cases where this order was not carried out.

38. Obstlt. DIETRICH PAUL JOE

Regular officer, about 46 years old, joined Abwehr in 1938. Was previously with the Police. DIETRICH was extremely good at handling agents. He was, however, handicapped by his excessive love of detail and his lack of power of delegation. He tended to want to do everything important himself. He was successful as leader of his unit but failed to get the best out of his unit and the units under his command. He permitted only a very small number of his associates to know his plans and the details of the handling of agents. The people who were most in the picture were Lt (formerly SS-RT) SCHMIDT and Frau RICH, DIETRICH's secretary. DIETRICH was rather nervous and excitable. In spite of these failings he was very much more able than the average officer in III West.

39. CC DIETRICH PAUL JOE

PAUL PAUL JOE

Age about 56 yrs; height about 1.75 m; normal build; white hair; light eyes; wears glasses for reading; clean-shaven; fresh complexion; energetic personality; typical command; leader; was a regular officer.

SECRET

40. WILLIAM J. WILSON

Major. About 35 years old. Formerly an officer in the 7th Air Force, he was transferred to the 1st Air Force in Feb. 43. There was a considerable shortage of young officers and many officers who were too old for this work had to be employed. They were often unequal to the physical strain the work imposed. As a result of this there were, during the fifteen months from November 1942, many and frequent changes among personnel. The tendency was to replace older officers by younger ones. The latter were, however, nearly always beginners in the field of counter-intelligence and there was little time and opportunity to train them thoroughly.

41. The following, who had a sound knowledge of counter-espionage, were the most competent officers in the 7th and 1st AFs.

42. WILLIAM J. WILSON

About 32 years old, a wine merchant by profession in SPOON. Was PI's assistant between 1942 and autumn 1944. He was a conscientious and quick worker with sound judgment. Most agents mentioned by PI were also known to WILSON, who may know some additional ones. In autumn 1944 WILSON was transferred to 7th AF. He is now in charge of PI.

43. WILLIAM J. WILSON

Regular officer, about 41 years old. Formerly with the 7th AF. Was transferred to the 1st AF in Nov. 43 after WILSON was sent out. He believes that WILSON has been working in counter-espionage since 1941. He went to SPOON at end of 1942 or early 1943. After the occupation of the South of FRANCE he became leader of PI. Subsequently transferred to 7th AF. He is now in charge of PI. He is a very competent officer and has the task of protecting Y agents. He is not particularly outstanding in abilities but one of the best officers in the 1st AF. He was by his under-estimating and thoroughness.

44. WILLIAM J. WILSON

Major officer. Worked for a long time with WILSON in 7th AF. WILSON has a high opinion of him. It is worth to mention in opinion about WILSON's personality and efficiency, as he was the only one for months at few occasions.

45. WILLIAM J. WILSON

Major in charge of a PI (Y) which belonged to 7th AF. WILSON frequently spoke with WILSON. He can give no further information. He believes in his power as a PI.

46. WILLIAM J. WILSON

Major officer. About 35 years old. In charge of PI 14, belonging to 7th AF. He believes that WILSON joined WILSON in 1941 or 1942. Started counter-espionage work in 1943. According to WILSON, he worked very well indeed. He was mentioned by WILSON as being very good.

47. WILLIAM J. WILSON

Major officer. About 35 years old. In charge of PI 14. WILSON was a regular one of the most competent leaders of PI. He was frequently mentioned in penetrating the work of PI.

RESERVISTS
(cont.)

47. (cont.)

agents and resistance groups, particularly in area D120. His superiors invariably reported very favourably about his work. He was particularly successful in looking after, handling and running agents.

48. Obit WINTER

Reserve officer. Between 30 and 35 years old. Worked in PAK 306 under Maj V. WINTER. A quiet but active officer who worked under V. WINTER as early as 1942 and during the Russian campaign. He remained with V. WINTER when the latter was transferred to the West. WINTER was handicapped by a serious leg wound.

49. Obit WINTER

Reserve officer. Age 35 to 38 years. In command of PAK 357 from Nov 44. WINTER worked in the field of counter-espionage in PAK 357 from 1941 to 1944 and achieved considerable success. He was very competent and successfully recruited, ran and handled agents. He is ambitious. In Dec 44 or Jan 45 he was transferred to PAK VI 2 of the West, against the wishes of Leitzelt III West.

50. Obit WINTER

Reserve officer. Age 30 to 35 years. Recently in command of PAK 305. As far as PI knows, WINTER worked in counter-espionage since 1943. He worked for a few months under Maj V. WINTER and was thus well schooled; he was one of the best intelligence officers. He was handicapped by having lost a leg.

51. LA WINTER

Reserve officer. About 30 years. Was for many years assistant to Obit WINTER PAK 315. He knew West, if not all, agents run by his superiors. PI considers him able in the handling and running of agents.

52. LA WINTER

Age 30 to 35 years. Reserve officer (reserve) a few months ago. Worked in PAK as SA in 1941 and 1942. Then with P. then Oberleutnant and became a member of PAK 306. He is energetic and handled agents well.

53. LA WINTER

Regular officer. About 30 years old. Recently in command of PAK 357. One of the most competent officers of the West, although he joined this organization only in spring 44. A good soldier with little experience. Able in the handling of agents and quite active.

SECRETPERSONNEL
(cont.)

MOB

54. Pr BIEGIER

Belonged to PAK 306. About 40 years old. Has served in counter-espionage for several years and run agents independently. He showed great aptitude and ability in this kind of work and achieved much success. Speaks excellent French and fair Spanish.

55. Wachtel SEIB

Belonged to PAK 306. About 35 to 38 years old. Was transferred during the last few months of the war to the Department of IO of OS West. Was particularly good as an evaluator while with PAK 306 and was of great assistance to Maj v FIEDLICH. SEIB was a lawyer in civilian life.

56. Pr or O/Pr HENZ

About 45 years old. Belonged to PAK 313 where he did good work in evaluation. Was a legal advisor in civilian life.

57. Pr RUTENSTRICH

About 41 years old. Worked on the staff of PAK 313 for a long time. Was recently transferred to a PAK belonging to PAK 313. RUTENSTRICH frequently told Pr that RUTENSTRICH was an able man. Pr can add no details about him.

58. Pr REISSEL

Aged between 35 to 40 years. Belonged to PAK 314. Was a thorough worker both in the field of evaluation and in the running of agents. Pr believes that he was a lawyer in civilian life.

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II. NOTES ON RELATED ORGANISATIONSA. REMAGENERAL ATTITUDE
OF REMA

59. P. believes that the REMA intended to make Frontaufklärung III into a mere channel for the passing of orders to all coms, and to compel Frontaufklärung III to confine its activities to the area of operations.
60. He heard that Obstlt FREUD spent the last few months of the war setting up centres for the purpose of obtaining CI information from territory outside the German and Allied operational areas. One of these centres was that under comd of Obst EIDINGER. See paras 67 et seq. It was known as REMA VI 2 West and had ALOIS as code-name in IT traffic. Major GLEICHHAUF belonged to EIDINGER's unit.
61. P. gathered, from conversations with EIDINGER and KREMER, that the intention was to give FREUD and his centres all CI activity in foreign countries and in Allied-held territory, under the direct control of the REMA.

B. REMA IVRELATIONS WITH
REMA IV

62. After the disbanding of Abt Abwehr early in 1944, and after Obst ROEDER, who had formerly been in charge of all military counter-espionage, had been transferred to Abt IV of the REMA, Leitstelle III West for Frontaufklärung, was placed under command of the REMA in respect of intelligence matters.
63. As repeatedly ordered, the Leitstelle was required to send Abt IV a copy of every report it issued, including those containing matters of purely military interest. This order was not carried out in the manner laid down. The contact between Leitstelle III West and Abt IV was very loose in spite of the fact that Obst ROEDER, who was highly esteemed by P., was with Abt IV. ROEDER had been made junior to several young CI officers, and as a result he clearly lost interest in his work. During the time that he belonged to Abt IV, he did not once visit Leitstelle III West, neither did any other member of Abt IV. P. refrained from visiting the department of Chief Frontaufklärung.
64. The relationship with Abt IV was thus confined to endeavours on the part of that centre to obtain reports issued by Leitstelle III West. P. cannot remember an instance in which Abt IV set Leitstelle III West a task or informed it of what its requirements were. Leitstelle III West felt that their main object was the obtaining of military information for OB West and other military commanders. Abt IV did nothing to prevent them acting upon this principle, probably because Obst ROEDER was and because Abt IV did not wish to risk conflict with OB West.

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SECRET

RELATIONS WITH
REMA IV
(contd.)

65. ROHLER belonged to Abt IV of REMA until approx Feb 45. He had attempted to apply military principles to the control of counter espionage, but failed miserably, and several junior and younger SS officers were placed over him. He wrote to P. in Feb 45 and told him that he had left his department and was going to join a unit at the front.
66. About Feb 45, P. received a letter from ROHLER in which he wrote that he had left his last employment and was taking up an employment at the front. P. does not know what became of him.

C. REMA VI 2

Dienststelle
VI 2

67. During winter 44/45 a centre was set up by REMA under command of Oblt EINGER. As far as P. remembers, this centre was known as Dienststelle REMA VI 2 West.
68. EINGER visited P. in REHESLAGEN and informed him that the centre had been established with the object of carrying out counter-espionage in territories other than the operational area. EINGER told P. that Frontaufklärung III West was to hand over to EINGER's new centre all such agents and contacts working outside the German and Allied operational area. EINGER added that REMA VI 2 was to be regarded as being within the territory of REMA VI 2. There were differences of opinion about the boundaries of the new fields of activity. Finally, EINGER moved his centre from REHESLAGEN to SOUHEIM GERSHAGEN.

LIAISON WITH
REHESLAGEN III

69. From then onwards, Dienststelle III West had no more direct contact with EINGER's new centre. On the other hand, however, Oblt REHMER, who was formerly Heurer of WAT 357, was appointed by REMA to be Liaison Officer of EINGER's centre with Dienststelle III West, with the task of taking over agents and contacts which had so far belonged to III West and which were under the new arrangement henceforth to come under VI 2. In accordance with the written order from REMA, REHMER took over from Dienststelle III West the link known as "La Petite Dame".
70. The appointment of Oblt REHMER was not productive for VI 2 because he obtained nothing else from Dienststelle III West except the w/a contact. P. cannot state what duties REHMER had, other than the taking over from Dienststelle III West. There was no official contact between Dienststelle III West and REMA VI 2. The exchange of information or the making of requests was to take place through REHMER, but, in practice, no such thing occurred. About the end of Mar 45, REHMER ceased to be Liaison Officer between the two centres. P. does not know what then became of him.
71. P. never visited VI 2 and stated that he does not know its structure or methods.
72. P. has had no contact with EINGER since Jan 45. P. can give no detailed information about EINGER's unit at REHESLAGEN. He has never been there and has heard nothing about it. He can only add that Major GELCHAU also belonged to it.

19/12

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D. HEA III (Chief Frontaufklärung)CHEF FRONT-
AUFKLAERUNG

73. Chief Frontaufklärung was Oberst IG DUSTROCK. He was appointed about Nov 44, in succession to Oberst IG MUEKEND-SON EDEL. He is about 43, short, slim and fair.

74. DUSTROCK had previously, as far as P. knows, served on the Eastern front only. P. heard that DUSTROCK had, during the years 41/44, been IG in various Army Groups and Armies, during which time he had gained considerable experience of the work of Frontaufklärung. On the rare occasions when P. met DUSTROCK he was impressed with his extraordinary grasp of the activities and requirements of Frontaufklärung. P. first met him in Jan 1945. He cannot state what led to DUSTROCK's appointment as Chief Frontaufklärung.

ORGANISATION
AND FUNCTIONS

75. As Chief Frontaufklärung, DUSTROCK was in administrative control of all Frontaufklärung units I, II and III.

76. DUSTROCK was anxious to have a small but competent staff around him.

77. DUSTROCK's deputy was Oberstlt IG von den BUESENDE. He was about 34 yrs old, tall and slim.

78. DUSTROCK was responsible for providing staff and equipment for the PAs. All applications for appointments to PAs had to be submitted to his office, also all recommendations for promotion of members of PA units. His office also dealt with incidents for weapons and equipment for agents.

79. Recommendations for awards for bravery were submitted to the appropriate military commanders; recommendations for efficiency awards were submitted to Chief Frontaufklärung.

80. During the last few months of the war voluminous correspondence took place with Chief Frontaufklärung; because heavy losses were suffered by Frontaufklärung personnel, and frequently officers, of whom many were middle-aged or older, were taken ill or were unable to cope with the conditions imposed by mobile warfare.

81. As far as intelligence was concerned, Chief Frontaufklärung was not in a position to issue directives. He only required, and was given, reports of particular importance.

LIAISON WITH
HEINRICH III

82. P's personal contact with DUSTROCK was not close; he saw him only on two or three occasions.

83. Heist-He III West conducted most of its affairs with the consent of Chief Frontaufklärung through Heist-He III, with whom Heist-He III was in frequent telephonic communication.

84. DUSTROCK III, however, requires the assistance of a specialist member of Heist-He III West who could supply experience of the Western front which DUSTROCK lacked. It was intended that Major KERN RITZ, former comd of PAT 365, should join DUSTROCK about Jan 45. P. heard that KERN RITZ fell seriously ill while travelling to assume his new appointment, and was unable to take it up.

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SECRET

E. FUNKBEWAHRUNG AND DETECTION SERVICE (Funkbeobachtung)

INTRODUCTION

85. The following Section (and Section IIIA) should be read in conjunction with SIR 1106. It describes, from the side of the Funkaufklärung, the joint work of that organisation and of the WT intercept (Funkbeobachtung) which SIR 1106 discusses from the angle of the Funkbeobachtung. In particular it throws more light upon and corrects the accounts of the Funkausstellung, which is mentioned in SIR 1106 para 15 and paras 61 to 64.

ORGANISATION OF FUNKBEWAHRUNG

86. German WT intercept and detection was, at the beginning of the war and during the first part of it, centrally controlled by OKW AG NW Pu. This organisation worked for Military and Police units at the beginning of the war in accordance with an order from HITLER. At a later date Police intercept and detection became independent.
87. PW knew a Chief AG NW Pu who, as far as he can remember, left and went to the front during the summer of 44. This was Obst (Lt) DUMSCHER. He was succeeded by Obst ROBERTSMITZ, whom PW never met.
88. Officer in charge of intercept and detection for the Western theatre of war was Major DANK. PW met him in PARIS in 1941/42. DANK was a regular officer, about 35 years old, energetic and well-informed.
89. AG NW Pu ran several centres (Aussonstallen) in occupied countries between 1940 and 44. There was always one of these centres in PARIS, and PW had also heard of centres in BELGIUM, HOLLAND and GREECE.
90. The organisation and structure of Funkbeobachtung was changed very frequently, with the result that PW is unable to give a complete and clear picture of it.
91. The PARIS centre covered the whole of FRANCE, and for a time also HOLLAND and BELGIUM.
92. Functions of the centres of AG NW Pu were:
- a) Running and sending into action WT intercept and DF Cops, Fla and Sigs.
 - b) Distribution of information obtained (chiefly by DF) to units of the Wehrmacht and Sipo for the purpose of evaluation.
 - c) Evaluation of information obtained in cooperation with Sipo and Abwehr.
93. PW believes that the above-mentioned Aussonstallen were converted into Abteilungsstellen towards the end of 43.
94. The centre in PARIS was thereafter known as Funkbeobachtungsbataillon 1 (Bataillon). In 43/44 it was in charge of Major FRIEDRICH, a regular officer about 32 years old, clever and thorough. He was sent to the front about May 44, and succeeded by Major FRIEDRICH, a regular officer about 35 years old - a pleasant man but not very efficient.

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ORGANIZATION OF
FAHRL. & ACHUNG
(contd)

95. When it became Funkfernschungsabt 1 (Hoor) it contained two Cops, which may have been 615 and 616. Fu can give no information about structure and strength.

96. Funkfernschungsabt 1 (Hoor) gave orders to the Cops for the activities of the IF Pla and Secs. One of the Cops was specially equipped for locating ultra short wave transmitters.

RELATIONSHIP
TO GIPS

97. In 1943, the Gips gained independence of the Wehrmacht in occupied territory, and henceforth operated its detection units from its own HQ. Areas were therefore precisely defined, in some of which Wehrmacht intercept and location units were to operate, while others were reserved for the Gips, in order to avoid mutual disturbance. Funkfernschungsabt 1 (Hoor) could therefore after about 1943 not decide independently in what areas its locating units were to operate.

98. As far as Fu knows, there was no liaison between the Wehrmacht and Police detection centres. Liaison took place at highest level, i.e. between the respective HQs. Results of this cooperation were passed down to the detection units of both organizations. Leitstelle III West also had no contact with the Gips, which maintained close contact with the Sipo.

RELATIONS WITH
LEITSTELLE III

99. Relations between Leitstelle III West and the Military Intercept and Detection organizations were always very close.

LIAISON OFFICERS

100. OMT AG NW Fu had a liaison officer attached to Leitstelle III West. From Oct 44 until Jan 45 this was OMT BUCH. He was succeeded by Olt DIERZ (or DIER) until Mar 45.

101. It was intended that DIERZ should become liaison officer with FdS HENLAND in Jan 45, but the latter refused to have him because, as he openly stated, he did not wish any member of the Military intercept and detection organization to know what was going on in his organization. DIERZ then returned to Funkfernschungsabt 1 (Hoor).

102. DIERZ was seriously injured in a car accident on 25 Mar 45, and was taken to a hospital in ALSFELD, although the hospital was then preparing to surrender to the Americans.

103. For a time, Funkfernschungsabt also sent liaison officers for attachment to FdAs. These were MDOs in most cases.

104. Sections members of the Funkfernschungsabt were attached to units of Leitstelle III West to assist in the running of captured Allied transmitters when these were used for passing false information.

EVALUATION BY FUNKFERNSCHUNGSABT

105. Leitstelle III benefited from the systematic evaluation carried out by Funkfernschungsabt of all IF traffic to and from Allied agents, which led to ease in recognizing various Allied Intelligence Services.

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SECRET

RELATIONS WITH
LEITSTELLE III
(cont.)

EXAMINATION OF LEITSTELLE III

106. Funkhochschalt 1 (Hoch) also derived benefit from maintaining close contact with Leitstelle III West, from which it obtained evaluation reports about the organization and methods of the Allied Intelligence Services. These reports were, according to PW, the only extensive source of information available to Funkhochschalt, and assisted this organization considerably in recognizing important transmitters of Allied agents. Funkhochschalt also learnt, from the results obtained by Leitstelle III West, what security measures were taken by Allied Intelligence Services and agents to avoid being discovered by the Germans.

CODE-BOOKS OF FUNKHOCHSCHALT

107. Leitstelle III West also benefited from the work done by the code and cipher department of Funkhochschalt, which studied all captured documents connected with codes and ciphers, with the object of decoding and deciphering the IT traffic of agents who were regarded as important and could not be captured.
108. Valuable results were often obtained by Funkhochschalt. During the winter of 1944, the above-mentioned code and cipher department succeeded in breaking codes used by one of the most important transmitters of the Polish Intelligence Service in FRANCE. For months thereafter IT reports from Polish agents to ENCLAD were intercepted and understood; the same applied to orders they received from ENCLAD. The Germans also learnt that important military plans were known to the Allies, and a considerable number of names and cover names of officers of the Polish Intelligence Service were discovered.
109. The code and cipher dept of Funkhochschalt succeeded only rarely in breaking codes used by Allied agents in cases where no document containing the code or cipher was available. It more frequently succeeded in breaking codes when documents containing them were captured.

LOCATION OF LEITSTELLE III

110. Leitstelle III West always informed Funkhochschalt when a PXX or PXX had succeeded in gaining contact with a group of Allied agents which ran a transmitter. It was of course in the interests of Funkhochschalt to inform Funkhochschalt in these cases so as if necessary, to avoid interference by IT units. In other cases Funkhochschalt would request Funkhochschalt to locate an Allied transmitter.
111. It also occurred that Funkhochschalt asked for help from Funkhochschalt in cases where location of an Allied transmitter by IT had failed, and where it was thought that agents might have a better chance of success. These cases occurred mainly in large towns in which transmitters were frequently moved from one point to another. Funkhochschalt would then use agents to try and ascertain which group of persons was involved in the transmissions.

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RELATIONS WITH
LEITSTELLE III
(contd.)

LOCATION BY LEITSTELLE III (contd.)

112. Generally speaking, Frontaufklärung III West received valuable assistance from Funkbecher, and FJ expressed the hope that the converse had also been true.

F. "G" - ORGANISATION IN AREA COMMANDED BY GD WEST

ORGANISATION

113. In order to bring the organisation of what was formerly I G of Albrecht into line with the organisation of Frontaufklärung I, II and III, a G Kommando and three G Trupps were formed in late summer or autumn 1944 in the area commanded by GD West, with the main object of assisting and advising Frontaufklärung units in that field of activity hitherto covered by I G Albrecht.
114. The new G Kommando was under command of HJL Ant KRA in respect of intelligence matters and under command of GD West for disciplinary purposes. It was generally located near Leitstelle I West, with which department its cooperation was closest.
115. The three G Trupps were to be so located that they were easily approachable by the PAKs and PATs of I, II and III within the area of an Army Group. Generally there was one G Trupp in each of the areas of Army Groups B, C and H.
116. It was not unusual for members of the G Kommando or G Trupps to be attached to Leitstelle I, II or III for the carrying out of specific tasks.
117. In autumn 1944 Leitstelle III West complained that contact with G Kommando and the G Trupps was difficult. This was a result of transport problems which arose from the Allied bombing of German communications. As a result of this complaint a fourth G Trupp was formed for the specific purpose of being at the disposal of Leitstelle III West and with orders always to remain in its immediate neighbourhood. Pressure of events prevented this Trupp from being completed. It was only half established and never functioned fully.

PERSONNEL

118. Comd G Kommando
Comd of a G Trupp
Comd of a G Trupp
Comd of a G Trupp
Comd of a G Trupp
- HJL WILHELM
HJL FELZER (or FELTZER)
HJL GUNDEL (or GUNDEL)
Lt SCHMIDT
?
119. HJL WILHELM
About 31 years of age. Tall, strong build; full face. A business man in civilian life. WILHELM may have been in SOUTHERN HOLLAND at the time of GEMOUNT's surrender, perhaps in area BAYHORN ZELL, in which area Leitstelle I West was located at the time.
120. HJL SCHMIDT
Was Comd of the G Trupp which was placed at the disposal of Leitstelle III West. He was last seen in 1000 y/o WEL (TAMER) in Mar 1945. SCHMIDT is about 35 years old, of medium height, slim, fair, blue eyes.

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SECRETPERSONALITIES
(cont'd)

120. (cont'd)

No details are available about PELZER and CONRADI.121. Lt EME (or SEIL or SAMEL)

This man was a member of the G Kommando or of one of the G Trupps. He was about 29 years old, approximately 1.78 m tall, strongly built, thick dark hair.

122. O/TM MEHLRecently a member of Leitstelle I West. Formerly worked under Helm SCHWENK in I G of Amt Leitstelle Friedrich. About 35 years old, approximately 1.83 m tall, slim, fair slightly reddish hair, stoops. Draughtsman and photographer.ACTIONS

123.

The main task of the G Kommandos and G Trupps - it is believed that there were organizations in the EAST, SOUTH-EAST and SOUTH similar to that in the WEST - were:-

- a) Equipping agents with false identity papers on the request of Frontaufklärung units.
- b) Supplying Frontaufklärung units with secret inks.
- c) Training members of the Frontaufklärung units, and on their request also of their agents, in the use of secret inks.
- d) Supplying Frontaufklärung units with photographic equipment and, in exceptionally important cases, also with microphotographic equipment, and training members of Frontaufklärung units in the use of such equipment.

d. PAKs AND PAKs OF THE OTHER THEATRE ON THE WESTERN FRONT

124.

It cannot state numbers and details about PAKs and PAKs other than on the Western Front, but was able to give the following details about other Leitstellen:

1. Leitstelle III Ost
2. Leitstelle III Südost
3. Leitstelle III Süd
4. Leitstelle III Nord

125.

These units were all under the disciplinary and operational command of the Oberbefehlshaber of the appropriate theatres of war.

126.

It knows no details about the numbers of PAKs and PAKs in the above-mentioned unit, but believes that Leitstelle III Ost was the most important of them and contained over 30 PAKs. Leitstelle III Ost was commanded by Ober SAHNSCHULZ.

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H. CHANCELLER UNIT, 1944-1945
(Military unit for agents)

127. PI only once saw a document about this Regt; as far as he can remember this was early in 1944. He is unable to give detailed information and stressed that such facts as he can remember cannot be regarded as fully reliable.
128. The Regt was formed with the main object of giving all organizations which ran agents the opportunity of granting their reliable agents military status and supplying them with genuine paybooks and the usual documents.
129. Units which wished to make use of this opportunity were required to submit written reports about the agents in question and their photographs. The agents were not required to report for interview.
130. PI cannot state who commanded the Regt, nor under whose administrative control it was placed or where it was located. PI vaguely remembers having read something about the possibility of sending agents to the Regt for a short time for military training.
131. PI never made use of the opportunities offered by the existence of the Regt.

I. CHANCELLER UNIT, IN 2 (7)

132. This unit was the secret unit for Frontaufklärung personnel. It was located at BOTTENHARD. Lieutenant III Just and PI were forbidden to have any direct contact with the secret unit; PI never visited it. All matters concerning personnel were dealt with by application to or by order from Chief Frontaufklärung, who had direct contact with Gen Bru In 2 (7).

J. CHANCELLER

133. Karotten Kapitän Dr KUDT, who worked with Ant Alwin Ledtatschle Friedrich until Aug 1944, was an expert in ownership matters in the WEF and could give information about cooperation between Ownership and Alwin. No information is available about his recent whereabouts. He is about 42 or 43 years old, about 1.80 m tall, fat and fair.

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SECRETIII. ACTIVITIESA. PENETRATION OF ALLIED INTELLIGENCE SERVICES BYTHE GERMANSGENERAL

134. This section like Section II E (to which see Introductory Note) should also be read in conjunction with SIR 1106.

135. German counter intelligence used the following ways of penetrating Allied intelligence services:-

- (i) Direct penetration of Allied organisations by agents.
- (ii) Penetration with the assistance of WT detection.
- (iii) Making use of the discovery of Allied organisations by leaving part of them intact and by turning round captured Allied agents.
- (iv) Co-operation with field units at the front.
- (v) Exploiting the results of military action taken against Allied guerilla organisations by obtaining information from captured weapons, WT sets, documents and interrogation when a resistance group had been caught.

PENETRATION
OF
SI SERVICES
1940 - 1941

136. Direct penetration of Allied organisations by agents required an adequate number of French, Belgian and Dutch agents who, in their respective countries or among their compatriots, could play the part of genuine patriots. Many agents were recruited in FRANCE, BELGIUM and HOLLAND; this, during 1940/41 and the early part of 1942, caused the Germans no difficulty.

137. The agents were set to work singly, or in small groups when several acquaintances were recruited at the same time. They were ordered to avoid at all cost all contact with German centres or personalities; they were to find anti-German circles and to contact those under cover of being good patriots, with the object of ascertaining what anti-German action was being taken. Naturally the agents were required to report frequently to their German taskmasters, when all possibilities for further activity were explored.

138. There was at that stage no other training of agents. Schools for the training of agents were deliberately not set up; it was the policy that every agent or group of agents should remain unaware of the existence of others. As the taskmaster was at the same time responsible for the training of his agents, the running of agents was, generally speaking, confined to officers and to particularly capable and experienced Sonderführer and NOOs.

139. The agents were allowed considerable time for making their way into anti-German circles. If they ascertained that the circle in question was passively anti-German but did not actively work against German interests, the agents were withdrawn and given other tasks. Naturally, the agents were advised how to set about making contact with anti-German groups, but this was done only in the case of agents who had proved themselves or were regarded as absolutely reliable. New agents were required to contact anti-German groups themselves without guidance until they had achieved their first success. In view of the importance of the object in view, i.e. to penetrate organisations which

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INTERVIEW
1/10/41

139. (contd)

carried out acts against German military interests. The German authorities were prepared to buy access at the cost of any expenditure of time.

140.

When the establishing of such a contact had succeeded, the Germans attempted to ascertain under whose direction the Allied group worked and what tasks it had. Action by the GTP, and later by the Sipo, was taken only in cases when this was absolutely necessary for the safety of German troops or of military installations, e.g. in cases where important military installations were to be attacked by Allied air forces or sabotage groups, or in cases where important military matters might otherwise be betrayed. In other cases no action was taken to stop the Allied groups functioning, as it was more important for the Germans to keep the Allied organizations under observation and to ascertain what directions the groups received from Allied intelligence services.

141.

Examples of direct penetration:

(a) Leon JACOBS, former MCO in the Belgian Air Force, ascertained in 1941 that there was a group of Belgians in HOLLAND containing a number of former Belgian officers and other persons who were very active against GERMANY. JACOBS was able to contact this group in HOLLAND and was able to ascertain in a very short time that some of the Belgians belonged to a group of agents who worked a WT transmitter in BRUSSELS. JACOBS even succeeded in finding out the address at which the transmitter was located, with the result that the house was raided by the Germans and the transmitter went out of action.

(b) The French woman, JAMES, who had been arrested by the Germans on suspicion of espionage, was considered to be a great patriot among her circle of acquaintances in PARIS, who thought she was a British agent. After she had been won over by the Germans it was a simple matter for her to contact groups of persons who were working against German interests. FI cannot remember what successes she achieved.

INTERVIEW
BY FI
DIRECTION

142.

WT detection of transmitters was a very valuable aid to the German counter espionage organisation and helped the Germans considerably in operating captured Allied transmitters.

143.

The Germans were able to obtain a pretty good idea of the number and location of transmitters used by Allied agents in the West. Pienknecht published a monthly report with a sketch showing the location of Allied transmitters, and which areas were free from them. The Germans then concentrated their counter espionage activities in those areas where most Allied transmitters were located. They calculated that during the last six months of the occupation of WESTERN EUROPE there were between 100 and 200 transmitters operated by Allied agents in FRANCE, BELGIUM and HOLLAND, and that about half of them were in the areas of PARIS and LYON.

144.

WT detection also enabled the Germans to tell which Allied intelligence service operated a particular transmitter; whether it was operated by the SIS, French, Polish or Belgian intelligence service. BBC broadcasts were monitored and not infrequently code phrases were recognised as being instructions to SIS units. The Germans were sometimes able to ascertain which SIS units were in action in occupied territory and how strong they were. FI remembers that two SIS units were known

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SECRET

REFERENCE
SECRET
 (SECRET)

144. (contd)

as "JO-JO" and "LOU" in WT traffic. This information showed the Germans on several occasions which areas were of particular interest to the English intelligence service.

145. WT Detection enabled the Germans every month to take successful action by which the GVP, and later the Sipo, were not only in a position to find and capture Allied transmitters, but also to arrest WT operators and seize codes. This often led to the obtaining of new information about the organization of Allied intelligence services and about the tasks of agent groups.

146. When the location of an Allied transmitter had been established, action was taken by the Sipo, frequently with the technical help of Funkabwehr. In cases where Allied WT operators and important agents had been arrested, the Sipo nearly always tried to continue to operate the transmitter, with the object of obtaining large quantities of weapons and sabotage material from the Allies and of immediately arresting further agents the Allies might drop.

147. Whereas the Sipo was under orders to offer captured transmitters and agents to Frontaufklärung for their use, in actual fact this was rarely done, as the Sipo in nearly all cases disposed of captured agents and material in accordance with its own needs without any reference to Frontaufklärung. Frontaufklärung was able to get hold only of such captured men and material as the Sipo did not itself require. It was made impossible for officers of Frontaufklärung to interrogate arrested agents, even when purely military interests required it. Frontaufklärung had great difficulties in this respect and repeatedly asked Sipo to be allowed to interrogate captured agents. These requests were only rarely allowed and when they were, a Sipo officer was invariably present at the interrogation.

148. Exceptions to this state of affairs occurred in the front line area where Frontaufklärung cooperated closely with field units and where no Sipo representative was present. In such areas Frontaufklärung units were able to interrogate arrested suspects; they were, however, required to hand them over to the Sipo as soon as possible.

149. In BELGIUM and HOLLAND IIRP and Frontaufklärung were able to operate captured Allied transmitters for a longer period than was the case in FRANCE because the GVP retained its power in HOLLAND and BELGIUM after it had lost all its power to the Sipo in FRANCE.

150. In HOLLAND at one time more than 10 Allied transmitters were operated by the Germans under the cover name "HORDPOL". The Germans believed that the Allied intelligence services were not suspicious because they supplied considerable quantities of weapons and explosives and sent over more than 30 agents as a result of a German-controlled WT request. The agents and the material were, of course, seized on arrival.

151. "HORDPOL" was run by Obstdt GIKES, who later became cod of RUK 307. The episode described above took place from about the end of 1942 to early 1944. Representatives of the GVP, and later the Sipo, were always present in the dropping zones and were, according to IR, responsible for the arrest and treatment of the arrested agents.

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TURKISH
GROUP OF
ARMED AGENTS

152. When the GEP, and later the Sipo, took action against Allied agents, it was the policy of Frontaufklärung III to bring their influence to bear in such a way as to leave intact a part of the group of Allied agents which was not particularly dangerous to the Germans. It was done to enable an agent or those agents who had penetrated the organization in question to continue observation of the Allied organization and to ascertain what steps the Allied intelligence services would take after the arrest of some of their agents. In many instances, however, Frontaufklärung was unable to carry out its policy, as its wishes were nearly always disregarded by Sipo. In those rare cases where the Sipo did fall in with the wishes of Frontaufklärung, it was nearly always possible for the German agents to continue their work of penetration in the Allied organization.

COOPERATION
WITH FIELD
UNITS AT
THE FRONT

153. Close cooperation between Frontaufklärung III and units in the field began in the West only after the Allied invasion of FRANCE when an actual front was established.

154. At that time the FIA's were divided into Heideköpfe which were attached to the staffs of Armee, Korps and Diva for close cooperation in their areas. Field units and formations were ordered to arrest and hold all suspects in their area, both civilians and uniformed persons, and to inform the divisional He immediately. He would then inform the appropriate III Heidekopf.

155. This procedure enabled the Germans to achieve several successes in HOLLAND and AISEE NORMANDE. Among arrested suspects Allied agents were repeatedly found who were under orders from Allied intelligence services to cross the German lines. In some cases documents were found on or near arrested agents and these documents betrayed their tasks and in some cases the whereabouts of transmitters. Interrogation of these arrested agents nearly always produced satisfactory results for the Germans. The agents mostly spoke freely about their task and taskmasters and in some cases about other agents and groups of agents. In some cases it was possible to turn them round and to send them back to the Allied lines with the task of obtaining information for I, because the German formations were in great need of information about the order of battle of the Allies.

156. Several Alsatian women were arrested at the front. They turned up in the German lines with their hair shorn and stated that they had formerly collaborated with the Germans and had therefore been pretty badly treated by the French, and that they then emerged through the front lines. PW stated that, without exception, these women turned out to be Allied agents.

157. While the Allies were preparing their advance towards the RHINE, the Germans obtained information about two French officers who had important espionage and sabotage tasks. They had either penetrated through the German lines or had been dropped by parachute immediately behind the German lines. PW cannot exactly remember where this incident took place, but believes it was in an area WEST of GIEVEN. The officers were arrested. It became clear to the Germans that their mission pointed to important Allied plans in the above-mentioned area. A few days after the officers had been arrested, the Allied offensive against the area began. PW believes that the two French officers may have belonged to the SAS.

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SECRET

PROSECUTION
CHARGE
DEFENSE
WITNESSES
EXHIBITS
VERDICT
SENTENCE

158. It should be borne in mind that the close cooperation between Frontaufklärung III and field units led not only to the arrest of Allied agents, but also to the picking up of agents, deserters and other persons who were caught by the rapidly approaching Allied advance or who wished to join the Allies. Interrogation and use of such persons also assisted the Germans in penetrating Allied intelligence organizations.

INTERVIEW
EXHIBITS
DEFENSE
WITNESSES
EXHIBITS
VERDICT
SENTENCE

159. The combating of resistance groups, who had begun to take an active part in the war, was the responsibility of the local Sipo and military units in FRANCE, BELGIUM and HOLLAND. Frontaufklärung was not concerned with fighting or arresting members of such groups, but members of Frontaufklärung were not infrequently called in by military units in an advisory capacity or for the evaluation of captured documents. Fairly often resistance groups not only waged guerrilla warfare, but also reported to HOLLAND by WT. Such WT operators were interrogated by Frontaufklärung experts about their intelligence activities. They were often prepared to state all they knew and sometimes decided to work for the GIB. This again enabled the Germans to penetrate Allied intelligence organizations.

B. PREDICTION OF D-DAY

160. Leitstelle III West had no such material available about the Allied Intelligence Services that they were nearly always well informed about the development of resistance movements in FRANCE, HOLLAND and BELGIUM. The Germans could follow almost exactly the work done by the Armée Secrète, the Francs Tireurs et Partisans, the Armée Blanche, etc. It was observed how strong the resistance movements grew in 1943 and 44 and how they gradually became more dangerous to the Germans, particularly after their unification under the FFI, and after they had obtained a considerable quantity of weapons and sabotage equipment by air.

161. Plans of sabotage and sabotage discovered by the Germans were carefully collected and evaluated. Particularly noteworthy were those documents which fell into the hands of the Sipo in 43 and 44. They betrayed the important tasks which the active resistance movements were to carry out on D-Day and the days immediately after it. The Sipo had discovered the existence of "Plan Rouge", "Plan Vert" and "Plan Noir". They also ascertained that resistance groups were to be given code words and that messages were to be transmitted at certain times by the BBC as warnings to the resistance groups to be ready to carry out their invasion tasks and to start on them in case of invasion.

162. After this information became available to the Germans, all units of Frontaufklärung III West were ordered to penetrate as far as possible of the active resistance groups with the object of ascertaining what tasks they were to carry out at the time of invasion and what their code words were for state of alarm and for D-Day, and for the signal order to start carrying out their tasks.

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163. In quite a number of cases the Germans succeeded in finding out what they wanted to know. On 1 Jun 44 a number of announcements were broadcast by the BBC which were recognized as announcements for the state of alarm. On the afternoon of 5 Jun 44 more announcements were broadcast by the BBC and these were recognized as being orders to start carrying out the invasion tasks. As far as PI can remember, about 25 BBC announcements were recognized for what they were. They were all broadcast on 1 and 5 Jun 44, so that the beginning of the invasion could be approximately worked out.
164. On the evening of 5 Jun 44 at approximately 2100 hours, Leitstelle III West notified OB West, IS FRANKFURT, Oberst ROEMER, Leitstelle I West, Leitstelle II West and all III ROKs by LF, teletype or in writing that the invasion was due to begin that same night or at the latest within the next 36 hours.
165. PI heard that an enquiry was subsequently held by the Wehrmachtführungstab and that the findings of the court of enquiry were that insufficient importance had been attached to the report from Leitstelle III West.
166. When PI informed OB West he was not entirely believed. Nevertheless OB West passed on the information to the 7th and 15th Armies. PI heard that 7th Army took no action, while 15th Army ordered its units to be ready for immediate action.
167. IS FRANKFURT also received PI's report with a measure of doubt. As PI subsequently heard, no action whatsoever was taken.
168. The significance of the greater part of Allied announcements was comprehended not by Frontaufklärung III but by the Sipo in FLICZ, which, in cooperation with Parkwehr, had captured a number of wireless transmitters operated by members of the SIS and had continued to transmit to MI in BOULON without, in their own opinion, having been detected. This operation had enabled the Sipo to capture some weapons and sabotage equipment dropped in containers by the Allies and destined for the SIS. PI believes that the Sipo also succeeded in capturing some members of the SIS who landed by parachute. Details of these cases are not known to PI. They were handled by the Sipo in charge of Stabs III ROK.
169. Such successes as were achieved by Frontaufklärung III West were the result of operations carried out by SSJ 306, SSJ 7 FLICZ. From MIKKE of Leitstelle III West interviewed were members of the Allied Intelligence Services in the presence of Sipo officials. PI does not know any details of these matters, but stated that SSJ 306 had possibly during investigation of Col ROBERTSON's contacts with resistance groups in FLICZ, obtained information about their intentions in the invasion period and about who was for state of alarm and action.

C. DISTRIBUTION OF INFORMATION

170. When espionage or sabotage plans were seized and such plans were of tactical importance, or brought to light danger to German troops German centres or military objectives, all appropriate units were informed as quickly as possible so that security measures could be taken. Furthermore, approximately every three weeks Leitstelle III West issued to all interested parties reports in which information was given about all Allied plans in the WEST which had recently come to

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SECRET

170. (contd)

lights. These reports frequently contained sketches and tables of various kinds. During the early part of 1944, the reports showed clearly that Allied Intelligence Services were mainly interested in WORKING PAPER and especially in the COUNCIL aspect.

D. DETECTIVE MEASURES

171. This form of activity of Leitstelle III is noted here ad hoc. This work, which had previously been done exclusively by Abwehr IIID, passed to some extent into the hands of the local Co-in-C during the war, and some of it was carried out through Leitstelle III. This matter has been embodied in a separate report, SIR 1720, where it is discussed at greater length.

2. INTELLIGENCE WORK AFTER D-DAY

SCOPE OF
SCOPE OF
WORK

172. After D-Day, the scope of the work was enlarged inasmuch as the military authorities insisted that Frontaufklärung should continue to establish contacts behind the front, among other things because of the lack of information on Allied Order of Battle.

173. The agents to be dropped were to have the primary task of reporting on military matters; information about Allied intelligence services was to be secondary. Unfortunately no aircraft could be obtained to drop the agents.

TRAINING OF
AGENTS
IN
FRANCE
IN
1944

174. After the actions planned after the German retreat in Sep 44, was the training of French PTF agents in CHARENTAIS, and their return to FRANCE by aircraft, parachute or infiltration through the front.

175. In order to train these Leitstelle III West established schools during the last months of 44 in RD 253 and in RD 254; these were run by Pw SCHNEIDER and Pw KERNER respectively. Obstlt KERNER supervised the two schools and the operations of all participants.

176. The schools at RD 253 and RD 254 were under direct control of Leitstelle III West.

177. The school at RD 253 contained 20 to 25 agents. Pw SCHNEIDER, assisted by KERNER, taught the agents how to live in enemy-held territory, how to obtain information and what information was required. Obstlt KERNER was the PT instructor.

178. The school at RD 254 contained about 20 agents. It was run by Pw KERNER, who gave similar instruction to that given by Pw SCHNEIDER in RD 253. PT instructors were Pfarrer KERNER and Pfarrer KERNER.

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